Carl Ungerer

Spit and polish for middle power - Opinion - smh.com.au

Spit and polish for middle power


Carl Ungerer
March 28, 2008

In his first major foreign policy speech this week, the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, returned middle-power diplomacy to the forefront. This was to be expected. Since Doc Evatt first used the term "middle power" at the San Francisco conference that established the United Nations in April 1945, Labor governments have promoted and defended our middle-power credentials.

Indeed, every Australian government since 1945, except John Howard's, framed our foreign and security policy under the broad heading of middle-power diplomacy.

But aside from a commitment to building stronger partnerships with the United States and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, Rudd's speech contained only a few hints of how Australia would apply this middle-power strategy.

The concept is not without controversy. In recent years, the middle-power label has been captured by normative theorists wanting to shift the concept away from its traditional moorings towards a model of foreign policy behaviour.

In order to rescue it from academics and to give it some real policy firepower, the Rudd Government should consider returning to the original concept of middle powers laid down by Evatt.

For Australia, a comprehensive middle-power strategy should contain five key elements. First, Australia would need to maintain a greater degree of independence within an alliance framework. Traditionally, middle powers have relied on alignment with one or other of the great powers for security, and Australia has been no exception to this rule. However, with a growing web of security relationships with countries in Asia and the Pacific, Australia will need to operate more independently than has been the case in recent years.

Second, and related to the first, is that, as a middle power, Australia has demonstrated a strong preference for the collective security principles embodied in the United Nations' charter. For many years after the San Francisco conference, Evatt would instruct Australian diplomats to "follow the charter". Consensus before military action increases its legitimacy, and it underpins the belief among the general population that the use of military force must support wider community values. It is a clear indication of what J.D.B. Miller once described as Australia's "dogged low-gear idealism".

Third, a middle-power strategy suggests a strong regional focus. In the absence of what a former foreign affairs minister, Gareth Evans, referred to as "clout" in the international system, middle powers have shown a strong preference for operating within geographic spheres of interest.

This is not to suggest that Australia does not have global interests; it does. Nor is it to suggest that sometimes Australia will need to operate outside our immediate geographic region. Members of the Australian Defence Force have been posted to military operations in the Middle East region continuously since 1956 and this is unlikely to change soon.

However, it does suggest that the bulk of Australia's strategic priorities and influence will continue to reside within the Asian and Pacific regions.

Fourth, the middle-power tradition requires that states maintain a high degree of defence self-reliance. In order to play a decisive role in regional security dynamics, middle powers need to sustain sufficient strategic weight to influence political outcomes.

Self-reliance ensures that Australia can act with autonomy and speed in responding to problems such as terrorist attacks, state failure, pandemic disease outbreaks or humanitarian disasters. Despite the stated requirements in the 2000 defence white paper, however, the defence plan remains racked with cost blow-outs and capability shortfalls.

This has the potential to undermine the broader foreign policy goals that Australia has for the region, which include the promotion of democracy and sustainable development.

Finally, Australia will need to include a stronger commitment to the construction of new partnerships with non-traditional allies.

In Australia's case, new partnerships will include building and leading small coalitions of like-minded countries to achieve specific foreign policy outcomes. We have already successfully used this method; we initiated the Australia Group to deal with chemical and biological weapons proliferation, for example.

In the more fluid politics of the post-September 11, 2001, world, this type of fleet-footed diplomacy will become an even more important element of Australia's middle-power strategy.

Dr Carl Ungerer is director of the National Security Project at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the editor of Australian Foreign Policy In The Age Of Terror.